

larger scale than in the general view. The shields here, as elsewhere, bear the letter H.

The carcass of the house cost 9,000*l.*; the stables about 3,000*l.*; and the cost of the whole, exclusive of the final paintings and similar class of decorations, about 30,000*l.*

ON THE MEANS OF PROGRESSION IN ART.

THE ARCHITECTURAL ASSOCIATION.*

The foremost question of the day, in reference to our profession as a fine art, would seem to be this:—"What are to be the sources of that inspiration which shall infuse into it life and progression?" And, looking at the various ideas propounded upon the subject, we find them to be somewhat as follows:—First, 'sturdy nature': advice which has a volume of truth in it, but, unfortunately, it leaves every one to his own interpretation of a most comprehensive term. He may take it objectively, prototypically, or abstractly,—or even dogmatically and arbitrarily. For purposes of mental culture and art education, it is too unbounded in its import as generally set forth. Its practical use, hitherto, has been little else than as a phrase bandied about, containing, as we must admit, a very concentration of truth, but which as yet has received very little intelligible exposition; nor ever will prove of much value until divested of its cosmopolite form.

A second solution offered to this question is,—To study the spirit and requirements of our age, and adapt the present resources of our art to embody them. A third is,—To concentrate all efforts upon the least-developed but distinctive style: first render it exclusive and predominant,—it will then progress and become national. A fourth, rests the progression of art upon the application of new materials, and upon increased facilities of construction; whilst others impatiently clamour for 'something new,' 'something original,' as a new generic form, capable of modification and development. I venture to add to this summary of agencies one, not usually classed, as likely to give impetus to architectural art, and it is, 'the study of criticism as a science.' There is, I fear, too much agreement upon one point, to be favourable to true progress; there is a very general impression that in our present system, condition, or prospects, we have little else than evils to deprecate. There is no admission or acknowledgment of anything favourable or in the right direction. Whether there is more power in this cynical spirit than there would be in generous observance of the good, would seem to be a question settled in the affirmative; yet of all the drawbacks to that common bond which should subsist among members of the profession, as in itself a powerful stimulus to art, this captious and complaining spirit is chief. This dogmatic condemnation of that which is, and visionary requirements as to what ought to be, come neither in the form of enlightened criticism nor creative genius. 'There are some who can relish no criticism unless it be a pungent and distilled attack,—a criticism which mistakes its way so much as to degenerate into invective,—venom for wit, and a joke for a proof. We ought to be as much open to the observation of right tendencies as to admitted evils, and do honour and yield homage to successful art: the feeling of confidence and emulation that would spring up from thus acting would be favourable to its study and cultivation.

Every historical period brings with it its own characteristics, which become more or less evidently the sources from which the art of its day receives its inspiration and tone. That which fostered it in one age may be wanting in a succeeding, or the current of popular feeling and sympathy may even run counter to any prospects of its high cultivation, and accordingly as the intensity of art-feeling declines, its patronage will be limited, and its cultivation correspondingly feeble and superficial; when, and as this feeling revives, we may expect also a higher estimate of art as a study, and proportionate intensity of thought and effort upon it by its followers. This

is the condition to which we appear to have arrived—a revival of feeling—a resuscitation of all art that has preceded us; and it becomes a question what shall be the speciality of our day, not only as to art, but what shall be the presiding and impelling spirit that secretly inspires its votaries. But, independently of this change in the characteristics of the period which give the impetus to art, the condition of art itself necessarily results in altering the manner in which it is cultivated, and our condition, surrounded as we are by styles of art so fully developed, lessens the field yet unexplored: we and art come under new conditions, and new and peculiar forces are needed for it to become progressive. It will not, I know, be a favoured idea to speak of finality in the powers and expressions of our art; but infinite as may be its capabilities of expression, the development of the great cardinal styles, classic and mediæval, with all that preceded or accompanied them, must of necessity hedge in, and even have made use of the possible or applicable geometric forms. I would suppress the idea of new styles as a something to be sought after, until progress itself revealed it. Let the aim be not for novelties, but for perfecting the adaptation of that art we have handed down to us, until its expression become assimilated to our own society and its characteristics, as it has been made to do that of previous. The forms of art are not the property of one age—only let each clothe itself in them with truthful and harmonious adaptation. The spirit of close observation and earnest appreciation which this would beget, would correct the bane of mere copyism; the transition from existing characters of art would be gradual, but they would proceed upon a sound principle, and one that would be a thousand-fold more ennobling to the study, and more productive of results, than the loud and visionary clamours for new styles, as if art were like a series of fashions, to be altered at will. Neglect the study of that art which descends to us, in the eager expectation and looking for "something new," and we shall sink in our appreciation and conception of art altogether; but aim to master that which is, and to accomplish their happiest powers of expression, and freshness and novelty may emerge; but nothing ever came from mere outcry and expectancy. Perfect its expressions as required by the aspect and character of our own times and institutions, and I entertain—as a means of conferring upon it more character and dignity as a study, and as counteracting false taste—that architectural criticism should be investigated and advanced to the fixity and position of a science.

The distinction which was obtained between the terms science, art, and fine art, has gone very far to mislead and intercept a clear view of the great central laws to which all arts, fine arts, and sciences are amenable, as parts and dependencies of a great whole. 'The one has been thought to be the realities of the world,—hence, whatever is conducted upon known principles is termed scientific,—the other has been represented as the poetry of the world; one as a matter of fact,—the other as a reflection only of mind, whose ideas and images are not cognizable to science, called up by and addressed to fancy,—an irresponsible, and in all cases an arbitrary and absolute award or rejection. This is the foundation of the error, that each one has an inherent judgment upon art; for while no one ventures to exercise his taste in respect to the facts of nature, or in the domain of the applied sciences, all seem to assert the correctness of their own judgment upon questions of art, upon this assumption that the fine arts are amenable to no law. There is nothing without law; there is no such thing as a fine art having fancy for its foundation and guide,—laws which are the birthright and endowment of genius, so that his thoughts and productions accord with them, but which the ordinarily gifted must condescend to learn and observe ere they can judge aright. Ignorant taste is the upas tree blighting all the fair promises of art, the conceit that claims innate perceptions because it has not mind enough to search out and acquire. And if this presumption that art is amenable to no law is an evil affecting the popular taste, inasmuch as it leaves it to be formed by the unrestrained admission of whatever may be presented to its undisciplined observation, how much better does the subject

present itself to the professional student? To what do the clearly affirmed and defined principles of our art amount? Put them together, place them in their sequential order, they as yet remain almost in the region of metaphysics, they shed but a tremulous light upon the path of the student, they exist like nebula, unresolved, emitting rays which lead the inquirer only into abstraction of thought, bewildering by their intangible and formless lustre. Art disquisitions, theories, and principles are considered, so far as they relate to architectural art, to be such transcendental as are little better than pure nonentities—"not practical." Yet we continually speak of principles, of canons, harmonies, and proportion, while scarce any are reduced to clear and distinct conceptions, so that the mind may analyze its emotions: none have yet given up that shadowy form of generalization which renders each so feeble, that their very definition is a controversy and debate.

The very fact that our criticism exists, as it were, mental and unwritten, assuming all the forms and dogmas of individual fancy, its very terms so involved in doubt as to the strict ideas they really stand for, is an evidence how backward we are in the collocation and registry of those facts, which, though constantly operating upon and determining our minds, are yet unareduced to axiomatic and propositional form, so as to be worthy of reliance, and accredited vehicles of demonstration.

It may be said that the subject of architectural criticism does not come within the range, and is not of the nature of the inductive sciences; that appreciation, or the emotion of art feeling, is purely a mental phenomenon,—that they are intuitive,—that beyond the simple admission of sensation we cannot reach. To this I would suggest the reply, that in criticism the process is to be the reverse of this order. This mental phenomenon of appreciation and emotion we take as a result, and our object is to ascertain the forces in operation; these we shall find to be of two distinct sources,—the one external and objective, the other mental,—the criticism we want as efficient for the cultivation and progress of art must regard both. The very theory of fine art is based upon this conjoint action of the external and the mind, not chanceably, but, if truthful, according to the design and ordination of the great Framers of Nature, who has made the human mind and the objective world beyond it as parts of one system, to attain their highest excellencies when faithfully responding to each other. We want a criticism that shall define the several parts which the mind and the objective play in the phenomena of fine-art emotions. That the one be according to what are termed 'true artistic principles,' and that the other may be rightly informed, that it may correctly receive the impression of the images, and give rise to corresponding emotion; for if this be not the case, we pronounce the judgment perverted, the taste false; but we dispute not the reality of the impression,—such as it is let the possessor enjoy it,—'tis not the only instance in which the mind may love a lie instead of truth, through its perversion and blindness. If this be not the case, what is the meaning of "art education," "cultivated taste," and what mean their opposites? Are all forms upon the same dead level? and is every mind to exalt that it pleases? But if the appreciation in some cases is to be pronounced false, from what are those principles to be derived by which the judgment is to proceed? This is the real question. Is the method of induction inapplicable to these matters? By no means. Difficult it may be, and very few may be the axioms and laws that could be clearly defined and written; but if they are laws and not merely "trains of ideas," let them be comprehended so distinctly as to become axiomatic and propositional, and criticism then will rise to possess higher attributes than does mere controversy and debate, which it scarcely does at this present time.

"Some law known or unknown rules each" is a quotation you will recognize; and this is the present condition of architectural thought, a series of queries answered in the affirmative or negative. But affirmation does not tell us what that law is. You can violate it by an experiment with your pencil, yet you can scarcely say what law you have infringed. The fact of the difficulty of resolving criticism into

